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Abstract
This study proposes a new approach to survey-based empirical welfare analysis, which combines a
new design of the conjoint experiment of Hainmueller et al. (2014) and a non-parametric rational choice
model. We focus on the welfare impact of a multi-attribute policy and report the identification result
of the marginal component eﬀect on the distribution of willingness-to-pay. As an illustration, the paper
evaluates a water improvement policy package for the not previously analyzed floating settlements on
Inlay Lake, Myanmar. Our estimation result shows that the average surplus gain from the lake water
quality improvement is at least as large as 5.9% of the average annual per capita income of those on
the lake. Moreover, attributes such as toilet provision have a clear welfare eﬀect.
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1 Introduction
The estimation of policy preferences is a central challenge in various policy studies including those in
political science, economics, environmental science, and development studies. A diﬃculty in the estimation
is multi-dimensionality: a policy typically has multiple attributes, for instance, an environmental policy
consists of its target area, period, and cost. To evaluate a multi-attribute policy, the present paper
connects a newly developed survey design and commonly used measurement in policy evaluation, namely,
Hainmueller et al. (2014)’s design of the conjoint experiment and willingness-to-pay (WTP).
Recently, a conjoint experiment and the associated analytical methods oﬀered by Hainmueller, Hopkins,
and Yamamoto (2014) (referred as an HHY conjoint here after) has become a popular survey experiment
design to estimate preferences for multi-attribute policy1. Their approach non-parametrically estimates
the causal eﬀect of individual policy attributes on observable choice outcomes (e.g., rating and/or ranking
among alternative policies). The advantage of the HHY conjoint is its design-based inference; while the
causal inference in traditional conjoint experiments is based on explicit decision-making models (e.g.,
the random utility model; see Train 2000), HHY conjoint inference is not. It is instead, based on the
survey design. All causal quantities of interest are defined and identified based on Rubin’s potential
outcome framework (Neyman 1923; Rubin 1974), and their estimation result is then free from bias due to
specification error in the decision-making model2.
However, design-based approaches have had the common limitation that the approach cannot esti-
mate the causal eﬀect on "unobservable" outcomes, of which, probably the most relevant from policy
implementation perspective is WTP. WTP is the maximum amount that people are willing to pay for
policy implementation, which is a common measurement in policy evaluation among not only academic
researchers but also policy practitioners (see Mishan and Quah 2007). Conventionally, WTP is defined
over an explicitly-specified decision-making model, while the original inference of HHY conjoint does not
assume any explicit specification. Conventional conjoint analyses are based on specific choice models that
require parametric assumptions on the preference distribution. For wexample, the conventional random
utility model assumes that the preference for observable characteristics is additive separable, the preference
for unobservable characteristics follows the type-I extreme value distribution, and the preference parame-
1An increasing number of studies use the new randomized conjoint analysis to examine policy preferences. These include
studies on international environmental agreements (Bechtel and Scheve 2013, Gampfer, Bernauer, and Kachi 2014, Bernauer
and Gampfer 2015) and migration policies (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015).
2Hainmueller et al. (2015) provide evidence that the HHY conjoint performs well at replicating real-world behavior by
comparison with natural experiments.
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ters of observable characteristics follow the normal distribution3. The estimation results then potentially
depend on these parametric assumptions.
Our approach is based on a rational choice model but without any functional form assumption on the
preference distribution. Without sacrificing the virtue of the HHY conjoint –of not depending on any
specific decision-making model– the present paper introduces a new approach to draw welfare implications
from the HHY conjoint with minimal behavioral assumptions. We define the marginal component eﬀect
on the WTP distribution (MCE-WTP) as a causal eﬀect of each policy attribute on the marginal WTP
distribution and show that the MCE-WTP can be non-parametrically recovered from the average marginal
component eﬀect introduced in HHY conjoint.4
This paper first theoretically identifies that the WTP distribution of a policy alternative defined by a
set of given values of attributes (referred to as the conditional WTP distribution, the definition of which is
provided below) can be recovered. Therefore, we can potentially estimate the exact relationship between
the WTP distribution and a multi-attribute policy. Similarly, we show that a causal eﬀect of a change
in each policy attribute on conditional WTP distributions can also be theoretically recovered. However,
there are two problems in directly applying these identification results in practice. The first problem is
that in many cases, the sample size may not be insuﬃcient to empirically recover the distributions. The
second problem is the limited variation in the “individual policy burden” of the conjoint experiment.
This paper thus introduces a more practical causal quantity, MCE-WTP, that allows for the evaluation
of the causal impact of each attribute on the marginal WTP distribution given a reasonable sample size,
where the distributional eﬀects of attributes other than the financial burden and the attribute of interest
are marginalized. Here, if the survey design has enough and continuous variation in the monetary burden
of policy implementation (and the sample size is large enough), the MCE-WTP is globally recovered from
the conjoint data, and the MCE-WTP is then point-identified. However, the policy burden often has only
limited discrete variation. For instance, in our illustration, the individual burden has only four levels,
namely, 5,000, 10,000, 15,000, and 20,000 kyats5. We therefore show that, even in the case of limited
variation in the level of policy burden, the MCE-WTP distribution is partially estimated. Furthermore,
we also demonstrate the estimation of a lower bound of the average marginal WTP, as the recovery of the
marginal WTP distribution is less restrictive to sampling size than that of the MCE-WTP.
3Furthermore, a conventional welfare analysis based on a logit model assumes that the underlying utility function is
log-linear in the numerare (see, for example, Small and Rosen, 1981).
4Throughout the paper, the term “marginal” is used in the sense of marginal probability distribution, such that the
marginal variable integrates away all other “conditional” variables into the margin of the table.
5The kyat is a currency unit in Myanmar.
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As an application of our approach, we then estimate the WTP of floating settlements on Inlay lake in
Myanmar. Although its main purpose is to illustrate our methodology, the results obtained nevertheless
hold some empirical relevance. While those residents face serious environmental problems, such as water
quality degradation, there are no previous studies to estimate the preference for a water improvement
policy. Moreover, our non-parametric approach is especially relevant, as there is insuﬃcient empirical
evidence that provides prior knowledge on the preference structure to justify any specific assumption
concerning the form of the utility function, with such studies in these disadvantaged areas in the developing
hemisphere being extremely limited. Our estimation results show that the lower bound of the average
marginal WTP for the representative water improvement policy is already as high as 5.9% of respondents’
income, on average. Moreover, the estimated WTP distribution reveals heterogeneous preferences for the
policy across settlements. Regarding the causal eﬀect of each individual attribute, we find that the toilet
provision and joint implementation with an NGO are two important attributes that positively influence
WTP.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present our non-parametric
method for WTP identification after an overview of the literature on WTP estimation. Section 3 applies
the methodology to the empirical case of water quality improvement policy for Inlay Lake, where we
discuss the current situation and potential policy as empirical background; this is followed by the survey
design, estimation strategy and results. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Non-Parametric WTP Estimation Methodology
This section shows the new approach to draw out the welfare implications directly from the data generated
by the HHY conjoint experiment (Hainmueller, et al. 2014), without relying on the strong assumptions
that conventional methods such as those based on random utility models require. As mentioned above,
the major strength of HHY conjoint is that it can non-parametrically elicit the causal eﬀect of individual
attributes on the choice outcome, which conforms to Rubin’s potential outcome framework. It is hence
considered more robust than other discrete choice experiment methods that specify the decision-making
process using the random utility model. Extending the literature on WTP measurement without sacrificing
the novel strength of the HHY conjoint approach is the primary purpose of this paper. We begin this
section by reviewing the methodological developments of WTP measurement and then present the non-
parametric method of WTP identification.
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2.1 Methodological Background
WTP is a measure of social welfare, which is often used in the field of social science including political
science (among the recent works, see for example Bodea and LeBas 2016 and Fairbrother 2017) as well as
policy evalution and policy-making decisions (see for example Arrow et, al., 1993 and Alberini and Cooper
2000 while Competition Commission 2010 reviews methodology for the practitioners). For instance, in the
typical cost-benefit analysis, a policy implementation is justified if the average WTP is larger than the its
average costs.
Two main WTP measurement approaches are revealed and stated preferences. While the revealed pref-
erence approach observes actual decisions made by individuals on the realized policy, the stated preference
approach collects data on decision-making behavior in a hypothetical situation. The revealed preference
approach is often argued to be more valid than the stated preference approach, as it is based on actual
behavior. When a policy has yet to be implemented, however, we cannot observe the actual behavior that
can identify people’s preferences regarding the policy. The preferences for a multi-attribute policy that
can potentially have diﬀerent levels in each attribute are especially diﬃcult to identify with the revealed
preference approach.
There are two popular approaches when using stated preferences: the contingent valuation method
(CVM) and discrete choice experiments (DCEs) (Carson and Louviere 2011 provide a nomenclature for
stated preference approaches). In the CVM, respondents are directly asked about their WTP to implement
a hypothetical policy.6 The CVM is straightforward and became the dominant stated-preference approach
for measuring WTP in the 1990s. However, the CVM is not appropriate for estimating preferences over
diﬀerent multi-attribute policy alternatives because hypothetical policies presented to respondents have
common attribute levels in a typical CVM survey design.
In DCEs (including conjoint experiments), WTP is estimated based on hypothetical choice experiments
in which respondents are asked about their preferred choice alternative with multiple attributes. A main
advantage of DCEs is that they allow the researcher to estimate the eﬀect of changes in individual policy
attributes on the WTP distribution, which may be more informative from a practical policy perspective
(Hanley et al., 2001). Therefore, DCEs have become increasingly popular, especially since 2000 (see
Birol and Koundouri 2008; Carson and Czajkowski 2014). In DCEs, WTP is estimated based on a
common theoretical decision model known as the random utility model developed by Lancaster (1966)
6CVM is proposed by Bowen (1943), and Ciriacy-Wantrup (1947) and Davis (1963) is the first empirical application.
Carson and Hanemann (2005) and Whittington, Adamowicz, and Lloyd-Smith (2017) survey recent discussions.
5
and McFadden (1974). More recently, Wiswall and Zafar (2016) develop an approach to estimate the
distribution of WTP without assuming any restricted forms of the coeﬃcient distribution.7 Although
methodological advances have greatly improved the validity of estimation results, these decision models
retain some untestable assumptions: the additive separability of utility functions and error terms that
follow the type-I extreme-value distribution are still required. Insofar as these decision models describe the
true decision-making process, statistical relationships between choices and attributes are considered causal,
and the WTP can be recovered. However, these models are typically expressed by a highly parametric
specification with a particular functional form of the utility function, which is a problematic assumption,
particularly in the context of development studies where a priori information about preferences is limited,
or even non-existent.
To reduce the likely bias due to a miss-specified decision-making process, recent studies propose a WTP
estimation approach based on non-parametric decision models, which is referred to as non-parametric wel-
fare analysis (Hausman and Newey 2017). Bhattacharya (2015) reports point identification results for
WTP (and consumer surplus) of a price change in the discrete choice setting.8 In this approach, the pref-
erence distribution is not parametrically specified; instead, only weak assumptions are required. We adapt
the idea of non-parametric welfare analysis developed by Bhattacharya to the WTP estimation of policy
implementation by introducing multi-attribute alternatives into his model and report the identification
result of the MCE-WTP.
Moreover, our strategy for identifying causal eﬀects on welfare is in line with the suﬃcient statistics
approach in public economics (Chetty 2009). The suﬃcient statistics approach is a middle ground between
design-based (reduced-form) and model-based (structural estimation) approaches. In this approach, the
theoretical model formally connects the causal welfare eﬀect to estimable causal eﬀects, and those causal
eﬀects are estimated using the design-based approach. We also first show the theoretical relationship
between the MCE-WTP and the average marginal component eﬀect and then estimate both quantities
using the strategy as HHY conjoint experiment in Hainmueller et al. (2014).
2.2 Conceptual Framework of Non-Parametric Welfare Analysis
This section provides a general framework with a non-parametric choice model as the randomized conjoint
experiment, which allows us to obtain the welfare implications of a policy from the choice data. A key
7The cost of relaxing the assumption on the coeﬃcient distribution is increased cognitive burden for the respondents, due
to asking about their “belief” in the long-run in terms of probability.
8Hausman and Newey (2016) demonstrate a set identification result in a continuous choice setting.
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statistical quantity is the approval rating, which indicates that a policy is preferred to the status quo and
can then be used to recover the distribution of individual WTP without any strong assumptions on the
preference distribution.
2.2.1 Potential outcome framework
Before introducing the identification of WTP, we begin by reviewing the discussion of the potential outcome
framework of HHY conjoint experiment. In each of K choice tasks presented to respondent i, she/he
chooses a preference ranking among J hypothetical policies and the status quo. An individual choice
indicator, denoted by, say, Yijk, takes value one if an individual i prefers to implement jth policy in the
kth choice task instead of the status quo, zero otherwise. Additionally, the policy burden of a policy Cijk
and other non-pecuniary attributes is Aijk = {Ajk1, ..., AjkL}, where L is the number of attributes, are
also observed.
Let yi(c,a) be a potential outcome of a binary choice indicator for a policy {c,a} where c is the
individual burden to implement the policy, and a is a vector of attributes. The potential outcome yi(c,a)
is equal to one if respondent i’s stated preference rank of the policy is higher than that of the status quo,
while yi(c,a) is equal to zero if the preference rank is lower than that of the status quo. Let us define the
potential policy approval rating as
q(c,a) = E[yi(c,a)],
which is the share of individuals who prefer policy {c,a} to the status quo.
The average conditional component eﬀect (ACCE) of an attribute l is defined by
⇡l(a1, a0|c,a l) ⌘ q(c, a1,a l)  q(c, a0,a l), (1)
where a l is a vector of non-pecuniary attributes excluding attribute l. The ACCE can be interpreted as
the increase in the policy approval rating if the value of an attribute l is changed from a0 to a1 given the
values of the individual burden and other attributes.
Here we assume Independence and Randomization as follows.
Independence We assume that an individual choice indicator Yijk depends only on respondent i’s pref-
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erence and the attributes of the policy j. Formally, for any i, j, k, k0,
Yijk = Yijk0 if {Cijk,Aijk} =
 
Cijk0 ,Aijk0
 
Independence requires that the preference indicator between a policy and the staus quo must take same
value if the attributes of the policy are identical. Under Independence, the round of the choice task and
the order of the policy has no impact on the choice indicator; Yijk, Cijk and Aijk can then simply be
preferences denoted as Yij , Cij and Aij .
Randomization {Cij ,Aij} is randomized, as (i) {yi(c,a)}c,a is statistically independent of {Cij ,Aij},
(ii) Cij is independent of
n
Aij ,Ai[ j]
o
, Aijl is independent of
n
Cij ,Aij[ l]
o
, and (iii) it is fully
supported such that 0 < p(c,a) ⌘ Pr(Cij = c,Aij = a) for all c 2  C and a 2  a, where  C and
 a are the supports of c and a in the conjoint experiment.
Randomization stipulates the assignment rule of policy attributes and allows us to identify the approval
probability and the ACCE as
qˆ(c,a) = Y ij |Cij=c,Aij=a, (2)
and
⇡ˆl(a1, a0|c,a l) = Y ij |Cij=c,Aijl=a1,Aij[ l]=a l   Y ij |Cij=c,Aijl=a0,Aij[ l]=a l , (3)
respectively, where Y ij |Cij=c,Aij=a is a conditional sub-sample average of the observed choice indicator,
and Aij[ l] is a vector of non-pecuniary attributes that excludes the l-th attribute.
The identification of ACCE in (2) and (3) is diﬃcult when the number of attributes and their levels
is large, as the numbers of observations that belong to the conditioning set on the right-hand side of
the equations become small. HHY conjoint experiment then introduce a marginalized causal quantity,
the average marginal component eﬀect (AMCE). Under Randomization, the AMCE and its identification
become
⇡l (a1, a0) =
X
c,a l
⇡l(a1, a0|c,a l)⇥ p (c,a l)
⇡ˆl (a1, a0) = Y ij |Cij=c,Aijl=a1   Y ij |Cij=c,Aijl=a0
where p (c,a l) is a joint probability distribution of the individual burden and other attributes a l. The
AMCE can be interpreted as the increase in the approval rating if the value of an attribute l is changed
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from a0 to a1, averaged over all possible values of the individual burden and other attributes given their
joint distribution.
2.2.2 Rational choice framework
We next define and identify the component eﬀect on the WTP distribution based on a non-parametric
choice model. The following discussion reveals that the identified ACCE equation in (3) is a suﬃcient
statistic to recover the component eﬀect on the WTP distribution.
Preference The utility of an individual i in the absence of policy, termed the status quo utility, is
denoted by vi. The utility of an individual i under a policy {c,a} is denoted by ui(c,a). We assume that
the utility function has the following properties.
Monotonicity For any a 2  a, ui(c,a) is strictly monotonically decreasing in c 2 R+.
Continuity For any a 2  a, ui(c,a) is a continuous function of c 2 R+.
Boundary For any a 2  a, limc!1 ui(c,a) < vi, and ui(0,a)   vi.
Rationality For any c 2  c and a 2  a, ui(c,a)   vi if and only if yi(c,a) = 1.
Monotonicity implies that no individuals prefer a higher individual policy burden, and Continuity is
a technical assumption to ensure the existence of the WTP. Boundary requires that (i) individuals do not
prefer to implement a policy with infinitely high cost and (ii) must prefer to implement a policy with zero
burden9. This assumption stems from the fact that all levels of attributes oﬀered to the respondents will
only improve the situation relative to the status quo and is necessary to ensure non-negativity. Finally,
Rationality requires consistency between real and stated preferences in the conjoint experiment. The
9Although it is not noted, we abbreviate the term “weakly” here and below.
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assumption allows us to connect the approval rating with preferences as follows:
q(c,a) = Pr[ui(c,a)   vi]. (4)
Equation (4) shows that the approval rating or, equivalently, the share of individuals who prefer to im-
plement a policy rather than to maintain the status quo is the probability that an individual prefers the
policy over status quo.
One advantage of this approach is that the four rather unrestrictive assumptions above are all that
we need to identify the welfare impact. In other words, no parametric assumptions on the utility function
are needed, and the result is then free from bias due to model specification error. Traditional DCEs elicit
WTP based on the random utility model (See Train 2009) that, unlike our approach, assumes additively
separable utility to allow for preference heterogeneity 10.
2.2.3 WTP distribution
Let us denote by ⌦i (a) an individual’s WTP, under which an individual i is indiﬀerent between imple-
menting a policy {⌦i (a) ,a} and the status quo. Formally, the individual WTP is defined as
ui (⌦i (a) ,a) = vi.
WTP depends on the policy attributes a, and Monotonicity, Continuity, and Boundary ensure the exis-
tence of non-negative WTP for any a.
Individual WTP will vary across individuals due to the heterogeneity in preferences and cannot be
10Typically, it is specified as
ui = ↵ci ⇥ Ic +
X
↵li ⇥ Il + ✏ij ,
where Icj and Ilij are vectors of dummy variables for each level of the financial burden and attribute l, respectively, while
↵ci and ↵li are vectors of the corresponding coeﬃcients, and ✏ij captures the preference for unobservable attributes of policy
j. The values of ↵ci and ↵li are diﬀerent across individuals and are assumed to be normally distributed.
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estimated, but its distribution is estimable. We define the conditional WTP distribution as
F (X|a) = Pr[⌦i(a)  X],
which represents the share of individuals whose WTP is equal to X or lower, given other attributes.
Monotonicity then entails that vi = ui(⌦i(a),a)   ui(X,a) if and only if X   ⌦i(a) and, thus, rewrites
the above as
F (X|a) = Pr[vi   ui(X,a)]. (5)
This implies that the share of individuals whose WTP is no more thanX is equal to the share of individuals
who do not prefer to implement the policy {X,a}. Combining (4) and (5) yields
F (X|a) = 1  q(X,a),
which shows that the approval rating is suﬃcient to recover the WTP distribution. Incorporating (2) into
the above equation obtains an identification result of the WTP distribution, say Fˆ , as
Fˆ (X|a) = 1  Y ij |Cij=X,Aij=a. (6)
The WTP distribution can then be identified solely by the conditional sub-sample average of the observed
choice indicator, however, it again faces the sample-size problem.
A more practical welfare quantity is the marginal WTP distribution, which is defined as
F (X) =
X
a
F (X|a)⇥ p(a), (7)
where p(a) is a joint probability distribution of attributes. The marginal WTP distribution is interpreted
as the share of individuals having WTP of X or lower, averaged over all the possible values of attributes
given their joint probability distribution p (a). Combining this with (6) and (7) yields an identification
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result:
Fˆ (X) = 1  Y ij |Cij=X . (8)
The marginal WTP distribution identifies the welfare implications of a “representative” policy. Specifically,
by allowing for heterogeneous preferences, our approach can obtain the distributional implication of WTP
without imposing any restriction on the WTP distribution. In fact, our conjoint analysis reveals significant
heterogeneity in WTP (see Section 5).
Here, let us define F 1 (F ) as the inverse function of F (X). Then, the average WTP is defined as
µ =
´ 1
0 F
 1 ( ) d , which we can also identify under the following assumption.
Full support The individual burden has a continuous distribution over the positive real space, or equiv-
alently,  c = R+.
Under Full support, we can identify E [Yij |Cij = X] for any X 2 R+, and the average marginal WTP is
then point-identified as
µˆ =
ˆ 1
0
Fˆ 1 ( ) d . (9)
This is also an important welfare quantity because the compensation principle argues that the implemen-
tation of a policy is justified if the average costs of such a policy are lower than its benefits.
2.2.4 Component eﬀect on WTP distribution
While the marginal WTP distribution given in (8) yields the “representative” WTP distribution, the
component eﬀect on the WTP distribution evaluates the causal eﬀect of each attribute on welfare. First,
the conditional component eﬀect on the WTP distribution (CCE-WTP) is defined as
⇧l (X|a1, a0,a l) = F (X|a1,a l)  F (X|a0,a l),
where a l is a vector of attributes excluding the l-th attribute. The CCE-WTP can be interpreted as the
increase in the share of WTP less than X if the value of an attribute l is changed, say from a0 to a1, given
other attributes a l.
The identification result of the conditional WTP distribution in (6) allows us to identify the CCE-WTP
as
⇧ˆl (X|a1, a0,a l) = Y ij |Cij=X,Alij=a0,A lij=a l   Y ij |Cij=X,Alij=a1,A lij=a l , (10)
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because F (X|a,a l) = 1 E
h
Yij |Cij = X,Aijl = a,Aij[ l] = a l
i
. The above equation shows that ⇧ˆl (X|a1, a0,a l)
is simply identified by the diﬀerence-in-means estimators, but its use in statistical inference is also diﬃcult
due to sample size problems.
Similar to the above, the marginal component eﬀect on the WTP distribution (MCE-WTP) is defined
as
⇧l(X|a1, a0) =
X
a l
⇧l (X|a1, a0,a l)⇥ p(a l).
The MCE-WTP can be interpreted as the increase in the share of WTP less than X if the value of an
attribute l is changed from a0 to a1, averaged over all the possible values of other attributes given their
joint distribution p (a l). From equation (10), the MCE-WTP is then empirically identified as
⇧ˆl(X|a1, a0) = Y ij |Cij=X,Aijl=a0   Y ij |Cij=X,Aijl=a1 . (11)
Equation (11) shows that the MCE-WTP is estimated by the average value of Yij conditional only on the
individual burden and the level of the attribute of interest.
2.2.5 Partial identification: a bounds analysis
An important note is that Full support is often not well observed because the proposed policy burden in
the conjoint experiment may have only a discrete variation. For instance, as shown below in the empirical
application, our conjoint data provide only estimators of the approval rating at four points, namely,
Cij = 5, 10, 15, and 20 thousand kyats. This section presents the bounds estimation methods, which can
be applied for those cases with discrete variation in the proposed policy burden.
We rewrite the average WTP as
µ =
kX
i=0
ˆ F (ci+1)
F (ci)
F 1 ( ) d 
where ci is the ith threshold value for c, k is the number of threshold values, and c0 = 0 and ck+1 = 1
such that F (c0) = 0 and F (ck+1) = 1. Using the mean value theorem, the above equation can be further
rewritten as
µ =
kX
i=0
c˜i [F (ci+1)  F (ci)]
for some c˜i 2 [ci, ci+1] for any i = 0, . . . , k. Since F is monotonically increasing in c, the terms in the
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square brackets are jointly positive, and therefore, letting c˜i simply be ci yields the lower bound of the
average marginal welfare gain, say µ, as
µ =
kX
i=0
ci [F (ci+1)  F (ci)] .
Similarly, the lower bound of the conditional average welfare gain µ
   
Al=al
is also obtained as
µ
   
Al=al
=
kX
i=0
ci [F (ci+1|Al = al)  F (ci|Al = al)] .
We can thus identify these statistics in the empirical application as follows:
µˆ =
kX
i=0
ci
h
Fˆ (ci+1)  Fˆ (ci)
i
µˆ
   
Al=al
=
kX
i=0
ci
h
Fˆ (ci+1|Al = al)  Fˆ (ci|Al = al)
i
,
which we obtain using the point estimate of the WTP distribution at each ci. In the following section, we
illustrate this identification of the average welfare gains for the case of water quality improvement policy
for Inlay lake.
3 Empirical Application
3.1 Empirical Motivation: Water Quality of Inlay Lake
We address the case of water quality improvement policy for Inlay lake in Myanmar as an empirical
application of our method. Inlay Lake is the second-largest wetland in Myanmar (Su and Jassby 2000)
and is located in Nyaung Shwe Township, Taunggyi District of Southern Shan State. The lake is well
known by domestic and international tourists for its rich cultural heritage and biological diversity. For
example, the Inlay Lake Wildlife Sanctuary, established in 1985, became an ASEAN Heritage Park in 2003
and a part of the World Network of Biosphere Reserves of UNESCO in 2015.
The population of Nyaung Shwe Township increased steadily from 77,000 to 189,000 between 1973 and
2014, with an average annual growth rate of approximately 2.2% (Su and Jassby 2000, Ministry of Immi-
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gration and Population 2015). This long-term steady demographic pressure combined with intensifying
economic activities on and around the lake have resulted in water quality degradation (i.e., eutrophication)
of the lake. Our findings indicate that, as part of the population of Nyaung Shwe Township, there are
17 floating settlements comprising 2,284 households and 13,794 people living on the lake at the time of
our survey in 2015. These residents intensively exploit environmental services, and thus, their livelihoods
are highly dependent on the quality and quantity of the lake water. However, their livelihood activities
seriously pollute the lake water.
For example, as one of the main economic activities, tomato farming on floating gardens represents
two-thirds of regional agricultural production (Butkus and Myint 2001).11 Consequently, 32.4% of the
open surface water area, or 46.7 km², was lost between 1935 and 2000 due partly to the development of
the floating gardens (Sidle et al. 2007). More than 15 years ago, Butkus and Myint (2001) reported that
the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides to improve the productivity of tomato farming had already
reached levels of overuse. Therefore, the excessive use of fertilizers and pesticides for tomato production
is considered one of the causes of eutrophication, with another being human waste disposal. Although
scientific evidence through regular monitoring and/or ad hoc research is minimal, Akaishi et al. (2006)
found that the concentrations of PO4-P, NO2-N, and NO3-N are relatively high in Inlay Lake’s water.
They also found E.coli or coliform bacteria in the surface water of the lake, which can cause diarrhea if
the water is not treated before drinking. While most houses dispose of excretions directly into the lake,
some village people still use lake water as drinking water.
To improve the water quality and the environment of the lake, various stakeholders, including state
government departments, the local government, international organizations (e.g., donor agencies and the
United Nations), and international NGOs, have pursued conservation through programs and projects.
Moreover, local NGOs known as community-based organizations (CBOs) have been established. There
are currently approximately 20 local CBOs working on community development activities, including en-
11Floating gardens are large blocks of organic-rich soil brought from the wetlands around the lake (Sidle et al. 2007).
These must cope with decayed grasses, reeds, marsh plants, and aquatic plants excavated from the lake bottom.
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vironmental conservation in and around Inlay Lake. However, there has been little improvement thus
far in the quality of the lake water (Norwegian Government and UN-Habitat 2014). This is because
most activities are public awareness and training campaigns, which are small and independent, and these
are occasionally joined by government eﬀorts to promote environmental conservation of the lake. There-
fore, large-scale and comprehensive countermeasures are required, including improvements in sanitary and
environmental infrastructure and regulations.
In this study, we focus on the floating settlements on the lake, as their livelihoods are extremely lake
water-dependent. Anecdotal evidence indicates widespread recognition that the quantity and quality of
the lake water have deteriorated over the last decade, which has increased the awareness and concern for
locals’ livelihoods. Although individual sources of income vary across the floating settlements, such as
traditional fishing, tomato production on the floating gardens, and tourism (e.g., restaurants and hotels,
boat drivers, sales and production of handcrafts, textile dyeing and silver manufacturing), most of them
directly depend on, or are aﬀected by, the lake water’s quality and quantity. Moreover, compared with
their income sources, the livelihoods of the residents depend more homogeneously on the lake water. For
example, boats, with and without engines, are the only means of transportation, even when visiting a
neighboring house. In addition, the residents still use lake water for daily activities such as bathing and
washing their clothes and dishes. However, the recent pollution of the lake water has meant that drinking
water and water for cooking have to be secured from alternative sources such as pipes from spring water
reservoirs or groundwater wells from the surrounding land, delivery tanks or rainwater. The source of
water depends on people’s location and wealth. From our survey, we found that only 11.62% of the
residents in our sample area drink the lake water directly, although most of the residents drank the lake
water ten years ago. The lake is also a sink for human waste and garbage, although some residents take
their garbage to surrounding land areas for burning.
It is thus highly likely that most residents of the floating settlements are concerned about the quality
of the lake water; however, scientific evidence on the subject is absent. Therefore, an important empiri-
cal task here is to investigate whether the residents of floating settlements’ WTP for lake water quality
improvements exceeds the amount that justifies policy intervention. Important evidence on the WTP for
water quality improvements in diﬀerent areas using DCEs is provided in many studies, such as Smith and
Desvousges (1986), Boatable (1993), and Huber, Viscusi, and Bell (2000). More recently, Bell, Huber,
and Viscusi (2009) and Viscusi, Huber, and Bell (2008, 2012) also report the WTP for water quality
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improvements. However, most empirical applications are concentrated in developed counties, where a cer-
tain amount of prior knowledge in the literature allows for reasonable expectations and assumptions about
preferences, and thus, the use of DCEs with random utility models may be justifiable. The methodology
proposed in this study is believed to be particularly relevant for the cases in which the prior knowledge
and information in the literature are insuﬃcient to impose behavioral assumptions. Thus, the welfare
analysis of water quality improvements for floating settlements on Inlay Lake in Myanmar is our empirical
objective in this study.
3.2 Survey Design
Scenario
The water flowing into Inlay Lake through several river channels varies in terms of volume and quality.
When there is heavy rain in the upstream watershed, some rivers supply fresh water, while others supply
high-sediment water, which have diﬀerent impacts on the quality of the lake water. Moreover, the spatial
distribution of floating houses and gardens, as sources of pollutants, contributes to the substantial variation
in the quality of the water in diﬀerent locations. Despite this hydrological complexity, there is insuﬃcient
information on the changes and variations in water quality to be able to generalize water quality over
time and space. Therefore, the scenario described in the experimental survey employs a narrative of water
quality improvement that requires no scientific information on the part of the respondents. The following
is the scenario given to the respondents before conducting the conjoint experiments.
“We would like to propose several diﬀerent public policy programs for improving the water quality of
Inlay Lake. We assume that all of the proposed programs will provided the same level of water quality
improvement, that is, the improvement in quality will be suﬃcient to ensure that water from anywhere in
the lake can always be used for cooking but may not be good for drinking. It should be also noted that any
money collected is fully and properly used for achieving the aforementioned water quality improvement goal.
The project is primarily implemented by the local government using this collected money” Since the status
quo of the water quality varies across respondents, the concept of improvement also varies. However, these
heterogeneous variations across respondents are captured by individual preference parameters.
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Attributes
Each alternative is a proposed policy program and is characterized by seven attributes. The first is a
toilet system (TOILET ), with three levels. In the first level, the local government provides a toilet and
a collection tank for each house. The second level adds a collection service by the government to the
services provided at the first level. The third level assumes that no toilet system is provided. The second
attribute is a garbage collection service (GARBAGE ), with two levels: once-a-week collection and no
service. In the pilot survey, villagers were rather indiﬀerent among collection frequencies, owing to a lack
of familiarity with the service, although they are eager to have the service itself. Thus, the first level
is once a week, being the most-preferred option in the pilot survey, and the second level is no garbage
collection service. The third attribute is a collective public wastewater treatment facility for dyeing and
silver gilt (WASTEWATER), introduced and operated by the government, with two levels: with and
without the service. The original scenario in the pilot survey had three levels, diﬀerentiating between a
mandatory connection and a voluntary connection. However, there was no significant diﬀerence between
the two connection types in the pilot survey. The fourth attribute, consisting of three levels, is government
regulation and guidance on optimal fertilizer and pesticide inputs for tomato production (FERTILIZER).
Its first level assumes that government services are provided only for fertilizer input, the second level
assumes that they are only provided for pesticide inputs, while the third level provides for both.
In addition to the first four attributes defining diﬀerent services oﬀered by the local government,
three more attributes specify the characteristics of the proposed policy. The first is the project period
(PERIOD), with three levels that specify the duration wherein the predetermined common narrative
target is achieved, being 5, 10, and 20 years. The next attribute is the implementing organizations
(ORGANIZATION ), which has two levels: the government alone and the government in conjunction with
local NGOs. In the pilot survey, villagers revealed a strong preference for joint implementation involving
the government and local NGOs. As mentioned above, in the study area, third parties such as NGOs and
CBOs play an active role in many public policy programs, augmenting government services.
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The last attribute is payment (PAYMENT ), which has three levels. The selection of payment vehicles
and the range of levels were examined carefully in the pilot survey. The pilot survey used three levels of
monthly payments during the given project period, from 3,000 to 15,000 kyats, where 3,000 kyats is the
hourly wage for unskilled labor in the area. The result of the pilot survey revealed that even 15,000 kyats
would not strongly discourage the willingness to support the policy programs; thus, we modified the range
to 5,000 kyats to 20,000 kyats, in four levels. Note that cash donation to Buddhist temples is common
practice in the study communities. Thus, we suppose that credit liquidity is suﬃcient to employ cash
payments in this study. Moreover, our sample shows that the average household donation per month is
slightly more than 20,000 kyats, which accounts for 6.7% of household income.
In our conjoint experiment, each choice set has two policy alternatives in addition to the status quo
that are then ranked12. The seven attributes and their respective levels yield 864 policy alternatives in
total, two of which are randomly paired13. Each respondent is required to make a ranking decision three
times for three diﬀerent choice sets 14.
Sampling and Survey
In collaboration with the local government and a local NGO, we successfully collected an up-to-date list of
settlements and all names of the household heads of Nyaung Shwe Township. We define floating settlements
(villages) as those where all residents reside above the lake, and identify 17 floating settlements comprising
2,284 households and 13,794 people, as mentioned above. From this total population, we randomly select
12
Making a ranked choice imposes a greater burden on respondents than making a dichotomous choice; however, we
confirmed in our pilot survey that respondents clearly understood the scenario and survey design.
13The order of attributes given in the choice set is fixed, despite the literature suggesting that the order be changed
randomly. However, because this causes confusion and diﬃculty for respondents, we prioritized reducing the burden of
repeated choice decisions.
14In the main survey, we used printed copies of choice sets. In the pilot survey, we used a computer. The reason for the
change is that computer screens occasionally made it diﬃcult to communicate with respondents in their dark houses. For
practical reasons, due to cost and time constraints, we prepared 144 versions of printed copies consisting of randomly defined
3-choice sets, which were also randomly assigned to each of the 327 respondents.
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327 households.15 Since there is relatively substantial variation in population size across settlements, we
apply stratified random sampling by settlement, with sampling rates of between 13.5% and 15.0% across
the 17 settlements. One of authors visited and met all selected households and conducted the survey
within one month. No respondents were missing from the original list of selected households. The other
co-authors participated either in the preliminary survey or the pilot survey.16 Considering the various
implementation challenges in developing countries, note that this ideal random sampling at the household
level and the complete survey should minimize any sampling bias.
The data collected from the main survey can be divided into two categories. The first category is the choice
preferences for the proposed policy programs. Here, we can further derive our main outcome variable from
the ranking information in the data, namely a choice indicator, with the appropriate coding. The choice
indicator compares the ranking between the status quo and the other two alternatives. Here, 1 is assigned
to any policy alternative with a higher ranking than that of the status quo, and 0 is assigned otherwise.
Note that if the ranking of the status quo is the highest or the lowest, both of the alternative policy
programs receive a 0 or 1.
The second category consists of household survey data, comprising six subcategories: (1) a household
roster, which identifies basic information (e.g., ethnicity, religion, age, gender, education, and job) and
the mutual relations of all family members; (2) sources of household income for the last 12 months,
with possible inputs including wage and working hours, production quantities, selling prices, necessary
costs, and so forth; (3) living conditions, including water supply, toilet, garbage disposal, and health
conditions; (4) possession and purchasing history of major durable goods; (5) financial conditions, such as
debt, savings, and donations for the previous 12 months; and (6) environmental awareness, which includes
perceptions of recent changes in the quality of the lake water, as well as three major causes from a given
list and the respondent’s level of understanding of the scenario used in the conjoint experiment.
The characteristics of our data sampled from the 327 households are as follows. Slightly more than half
15Khin (2011) notes that there are 35 floating settlements with 20,000 people. However, half of these settlements include
residents whose houses are not floating on the lake. We target only those settlements where all residents resided on the lake
at the time of our survey.
16The preliminary survey was conducted for six days from October 8 to 13, 2014, to collect 30 samples, mainly by means
of interviews. The pilot survey was conducted for 10 days from October 7 to 16, 2015, collecting 50 samples for the conjoint
field experiment. The main survey was conducted between December 29, 2015, and January 25, 2016.
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of all respondents are female (51.38%), and the average age is 44.7 years. Nearly 60% of the household
heads completed up to a primary level of education (59.33%), 21.10% completed up to middle school,
and 3.98% and 1.83% are high school and college/university graduates, respectively, whereas 13.76% are
illiterate. Family size ranges from 1 to 11, with an average size of 4.7. The total annual household income
ranges from 360,000 kyats (300 USD) to 21.6 million kyats (18,000 USD), with an average of 3.6 million
kyats (3,000 USD). Moreover, the average per capita income is 840,000 kyats (700 USD), with a range of
between 158,000 kyats (131 USD) and 5.4 million kyats (4,500 USD). Further details on the characteristics
of sample households can be found in the Appendix.
3.3 Estimation Strategies
3.3.1 Bounds estimation
Our conjoint data can provide only estimators of the approval ratings at Cij = 5000, 10, 000, 15, 000,
and 20, 000 kyats, which makes it diﬃcult to fully recover the WTP distribution. We then estimate the
lower bound of the average WTP. First, the identification result in equation (8) allows us to estimate five
probability intervals of the marginal WTP distribution as
Fˆ (5, 000) = 1  Y ij |Cij=5000,
Fˆ (10, 000)  Fˆ (5, 000) = Y ij |Cij=5000   Y ij |Cij=10000,
Fˆ (15, 000)  Fˆ (10, 000) = Y ij |Cij=10000   Y ij |Cij=15000,
Fˆ (20, 000)  Fˆ (15, 000) = Y ij |Cij=15000   Y ij |Cij=20000,
1  Fˆ (20, 000) = Y ij |Cij=20000. (12)
Equation (12) means that the “histogram” of the WTP distribution can be estimated from the conjoint
experiment.
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Next, the average marginal WTP can be rewritten in our context as
µ =
ˆ F (5,000)
F (0)
F 1 ( ) d +
ˆ F (10,000)
F (5,000)
F 1 ( ) d +
ˆ F (20,000)
F (15,000)
F 1 ( ) d +
ˆ F (1)
F (20,000)
F 1 ( ) d .
From the above, the average marginal WTP is further modified as
µ = X˜0,5000F (5000) + X˜5000,10000 [F (10000)  F (5000)]
+X˜10000,15000 [F (15000)  F (10000)] + X˜15000,20000 [F (20000)  F (15000)]
+X˜20000,1 [1  F (20000)] ,
for some X˜x,x0 2 [x, x0] for any x, x0 2 {0, 5000, 10000, 15000, 20000}, and X˜20000,1   20000. To obtain
the lower bound of µ, we replace X˜x,x0 simply with x, which yields the following equation
µ = 5, 000⇥ [F (10000)  F (5000)] + 10, 000⇥ [F (10000)  F (15000)]
+15, 000⇥ [F (20000)  F (15000)] + 20, 000⇥ [1  F (20000)] . (13)
Equation (12) can simply identify what is above the lower bound. Note that in our conjoint design, the
lower bound is estimable because Boundary defines the lower bound of individual WTP as 0. However,
our rational choice model does not provide the upper bound of individual WTP, and the upper bound
cannot be identified. This “non-identification” result of the upper bound is, on the one hand, a limitation
of our approach. On the other hand, however, the lower bound provides a suﬃcient cost-benefit condition
for eﬃciency improvement: the policy can improve social eﬃciency if the estimated lower bound exceeds
the expected cost of implementing the policy.
Finally, similar to the marginal WTP distribution, equation (11) implies that our conjoint data can
also estimate five probability intervals of the MCE-WTP as
⇧ˆl(0 WTPi  5000|a1, a0) =  Y ij |Cij=5000,Aijl=a1 + Y ij |Cij=5000,Aijl=a0 ,
⇧ˆl(5000 WTPi  10000|a1, a0) = Y ij |Cij=5000,Aijl=a1   Y ij |Cij=10000,Aijl=a1
 Y ij |Cij=5000,Aijl=a0 + Y ij |Cij=10000,Aijl=a0 ,
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⇧ˆl(10000 WTPi  15000|a1, a0) = Y ij |Cij=10000,Aijl=a1   Y ij |Cij=15000,Aijl=a1
 Y ij |Cij=10000,Aijl=a0 + Y ij |Cij=15000,Aijl=a0 ,
⇧ˆl(15000 WTPi  20000|a1, a0) = Y ij |Cij=15000,Aijl=a1   Y ij |Cij=20000,Aijl=a1
 Y ij |Cij=15000,Aijl=a0 + Y ij |Cij=20000,Aijl=a0 ,
and finally,
⇧ˆl(20000 WTPi|a1, a0) = Y ij |Cij=20000,Aijl=a1   Y ij |Cij=20000,Aijl=a0 . (14)
The first and the last equations are obtained from
Yij |Cij=0,Aijl=a1 = Yij |Cij=0,Aijl=a0 = 1
and
Yij |Cij!1,Aijl=a1 = Yij |Cij!1,Aijl=a0 = 0
as well as the Boundary assumption.
Equation (14) shows that the component eﬀect on some selected points on the WTP distribution is
estimable from the conjoint data with a discrete variation in the policy burden.
3.3.2 Estimation of approval rating
The data from the conjoint choice experiment allow us to estimate the causal eﬀects of attributes on the
approval rating. A la HHY conjoint, we estimate the following population model:
E [Yij |Cij = c, Aij = a] =  0 +  cIijc +
6X
l=1
 lIijl, (15)
where Iijc and Iijl are vectors of dummy variables composed of each level of the financial burden and
attribute l, respectively, while  c and  l are vectors of the corresponding coeﬃcients.
Note that the unit of analysis in the regression is each alternative in each task of each respondent. There-
fore, although the respondents are sampled randomly from the population, the observed choice outcomes
within a respondent may be correlated, which may aﬀect the statistical inference results. For example,
respondents have unobservable characteristics that aﬀect their answer in every task, which generates corre-
lation among the choice outcomes within a respondent. To avoid the bias from such correlation in the error
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terms, we use the cluster robust standard errors at the respondent level in all regressions, as suggested by
Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014).
To recover the marginal distribution of WTP, equation (8) requires us to estimate the approval rating
conditional on the financial burden, which is obtained from the estimation result of equation (15). How-
ever, the identification result of the MCE-WTP (equation 14 ) requires estimators of the approval rating
conditional on the policy burden and an interest attribute l, E[Yij |Cij = c, Aijl = a]. To obtain those
values, we estimate the population model with interaction:
E[Yij |Cij = c, Aijl = a] =  0 +  cIijc +  lIijl +  I (Iijc ⇥ Iijl) ,
where  EI is a vector of the coeﬃcients of the interaction term between the individual burden and attribute
l.
3.4 Estimation Results
This section first presents the estimated AMCE, which captures the average marginal causal eﬀects on the
choice probabilities. We then show the estimated welfare quantities, the marginal distribution of WTP
and the MCE-WTP.
3.4.1 Average marginal component eﬀect on approval rating
Figures 1 reports the estimated coeﬃcients and the 95% confidence intervals in population model (15).
Each solid circle in the figure represents a point estimator, while the horizontal bars represent the 95%
and 99% confidence intervals.
[Figure 1 around here]
With regard to the approval rating, Figure 1 shows that TOILET and WASTEWATER have positive
and statistically significant eﬀects, while no significant eﬀects of FERTILIZER are observed. Furthermore,
ORGANIZATION also has positive eﬀects at the 10% significance level. PERIOD and PAYMENT also
tend to have the expected estimated eﬀects: a lower burden and a shorter targeting period have positive
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causal eﬀects on the approval ratings. Note that the point estimators of individual burdens are not
monotonically increasing because the estimated coeﬃcient of 10,000 kyats is lower than the coeﬃcient
of 15,000 kyats. However, the results do not imply that the approval rating decreases if the individual
burden decreases from 15,000 kyats to 10,000 kyats because the diﬀerence between these coeﬃcients is not
statistically significant.
An important advantage of a randomized conjoint design is that it allows us to derive causal inter-
pretations for all estimated coeﬃcients, which implies that we can compare the economic significance of
the attributes. Among the additional services, the causal eﬀect of TOILET is especially high, with a
size roughly the same as the eﬀect of reducing the financial burden from 20,000 kyats to 15,000 kyats or
reducing the target period from 20 years to 5 years. Thus, Figure 1 demonstrates the high demand for a
toilet service, which implies that a water improvement project that includes a toilet service would have
more support from the local communities. Additionally, a collective wastewater treatment facility and
joint implementation with local NGO are eﬀective ways of securing residents’ support.
3.4.2 Results of the welfare estimation
[Figure 2 around here]
We first report the estimated marginal distribution of WTP (equation 8) in Figure 2. The figure
reports the estimated histogram with five bins, which shows that more than 70% of people have WTP
of more than 20,000 kyats in each month. Because the median monthly income in the area is 270,000
kyats, most people’s WTP is larger than 7.4% of median income. Additionally, the shares of people in
other ranges are approximately 10% except for between 10,000 kyats and 15,000 kyats, which shows the
diversity of individual WTP values due to heterogeneous policy preferences and/or policy attributes.
Note that the share of people whose WTP values are between 10,000 and 15,000 kyats is estimated to
be negative, which indicates that the Monotonicity assumption may be violated. However, this estimated
share is not statistical significant, and the concern that the assumption has been violated is not serious.
Equation (13) demonstrates that the lower bound of the average WTP can be estimated with the
estimated marginal distribution of individual WTP. Using the estimators shown in Figure 2, the estimated
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Table 1: List of the changes in attributes
Original level a0 New level a1
No toilet system Toilet system
Toilet system Toilet system with collection service
No garbage collection service Garbage collection service once per week
No wastewater treatment service Wastewater treatment service
Guidance on fertilizer input Guidance on pesticide input
Guidance on fertilizer input Guidance on both fertilizer and pesticide input
Project period: 20 years Project period: 10 years
Project period: 10 years Project period: 5 years
Implemented by government Implemented by government and local NGOs
lower bound of the average marginal welfare gain is 16,090 kyats. Because the median monthly household
income in the area is 270,000 kyats, the estimated average WTP is at least 5.9% of the median income.
This paper thus demonstrates strong aggregate demand for water improvement policy through the high
average WTP for the policy.
[Figures 3 to 8 around here]
Finally, Figures 3 to 8 report the estimated MCE-WTP (equation 14). We estimate the causal eﬀects
of following 9 scenarios of attribute changes (See Table 1).
Figure 3 shows the clear eﬀect of toilet provision; providing a toilet system significantly increases
the share of workers whose WTP values are larger than 20,000 kyats but decreases the share of people
whose WTP values are between 0 and 5,000 kyats. The figure further reports that also providing a
collection service does not have clear eﬀects on the WTP distribution. Therefore, our estimates consistently
demonstrate the importance of implementing a water improvement policy that includes a toilet service;
toilet provision increases not only the approval rating but also improves the WTP distribution.
From Figures 4 to 8, with some exceptions, we cannot observe clear eﬀects of the other attributes. An
exception is the garbage collection service; the share of people whose WTP values exceed 20,000 kyats
is significantly increased. Providing guidance on pesticide input decreases the share of the lowest bin
but increases the share of people whose WTP is between 5,000 and 10,000 at the 5% significance level.
Reducing the project period from 10 to 5 years increases the highest bin and decreases the bin range
[15,000, 20,000]. Finally, joint implementation with local NGOs decreases the share of people whose WTP
is between 5,000 and 10,000.
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4 Conclusion
This study introduced a new approach to non-parametrically derive welfare implications from conjoint
experiment data obtained by Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014). Using only weak assumptions
on the preference distribution, the method enables us to estimate the causal eﬀects of individual attributes
on the WTP distribution. Our approach can apply to policy evaluations based on WTP. This paper
applied this approach to the evaluation of a local environmental improvement project, and evaluations of
such projects are otherwise diﬃcult to estimate. Adopting this method to Inlay Lake, we conclude that
the water quality improvement policy generates an average marginal surplus gain of at least 193,082 kyats
per annum, which is 22.9% of the average annual per capita income in the area. Additionally, the analysis
of the conditional average surplus gain shows that including the toilet service increases the lower bound
of the surplus gain by 14%. The analyses of the choice probabilities and the surplus gain demonstrate
the importance of providing a toilet service when implementing a water quality improvement policy. We
believe that our approaches are useful in policy research to improve social welfare. However, our study has
an important limitation in terms of the external validity of the randomized conjoint analysis. Although
Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto (2015) provide evidence of the validity of such an approach in
developed countries, no studies focus on developing countries. Therefore, additional studies are needed to
test the external validity of the conjoint experiments in developing countries.
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A. Appendix: Details of respondents’ characteristics
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A.1. Primary and secondary jobs
[Table A1]
In total, 43.4% of household heads are engaged in farming, typically tomato production (see Table
A1). In the Inlay area, farmers cultivate tomatoes for 6 months, starting in March or April, and take on
other jobs for the rest of the year, such as fishing, carpentry, and seasonal jobs. Although tomatoes can be
harvested after 40 days from shedding seeds, farmers divide their floating gardens into blocks, and seeding
and harvesting are scheduled to be repeated every 6 to 14 weeks. Thus, farmers are usually engaged in
tomato farming for six months. Fishing is more common as a secondary job (77 household heads) than as
a primary job (44 household heads).
A.2. Composition of household income by source
[Table A2]
In addition to the job structure of household heads, Table A2 summarizes the household income by
source. The economic significance of farming is the largest, representing 36.13% of the total. Although fish-
ing was replaced by tomato farming, approximately 15% of income is still generated by fishing. Relatively
few villagers engage in small business, but such activities generate relatively large profits (approximately
10%). In contrast, 85 households (26%) generate income from local cheroot cigarette businesses as their
main supplementary income source. However, this represents only 5% of income, despite it being a common
activity.
A.3. Perception of recent changes on water quality
The respondents were asked to give their perceptions of recent (the last five years) changes in the water
quality of Inlay Lake. The results show that 48% of respondents perceive that the water quality of the
lake is significantly worse, while 4.9% perceive no change or that it has improved.
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Fig 1. Estimated effect of policy attributes on approval rating. Each solid circle shows estimated marginal 
effects of individual policy. The estimation is based on the OLS regression with clustered standard error; 
horizontal bars represent 90% and 95% confidence levels. Note that circle without bars denote the reference 
level of each attribute.    
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Fig 2. Estimated distribution of WTP. This histogram shows the estimated marginal distribution of 
willingness-to-pay. The estimated histogram is based on the OLS regression with clustered standard error; 
vertical bars represent the 90% and 95% confidence interval.   
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Fig 3. Estimated effect of TOILET attribute on the WTP distribution. Each circle shows estimated marginal 
effects of changing level of TOILET attribute on each bin of the histogram. The estimates are based on the 
OLS regression with clustered standard error; horizontal bars represent the 90% and 95% confidence 
interval.   
More than 20,000
Between 15,000 to 20,000
Between 10,000 to 15,000
Between 5,000 to 10,000
Between 0 to 5,000
-.2 -.1 0 .1 .2
No Toilet ⇒ Toilet Toilet ⇒ Toilet and Collection
 
 
Fig 4. Estimated effect of GARBAGE attribute on the WTP distribution. Each circle shows estimated 
marginal effects of changing level of GARBAGE attribute on each bin of the histogram. The estimates are 
based on the OLS regression with clustered standard error; horizontal bars represent the 90% and 95% 
confidence interval.   
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Fig 5. Estimated effect of WASTEWATER attribute on the WTP distribution. Each circle shows estimated 
marginal effects of changing level of WASTERWATER attribute on each bin of the histogram. The estimates 
are based on the OLS regression with clustered standard error; horizontal bars represent the 90% and 95% 
confidence interval.   
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Fig 6. Estimated effect of FERTILIZER attribute on the WTP distribution. Each circle shows estimated 
marginal effects of changing level of FERTILIZER attribute on each bin of the histogram. The estimates 
are based on the OLS regression with clustered standard error; horizontal bars represent the 90% and 95% 
confidence interval.   
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Fig 7. Estimated effect of PERIOD attribute on the WTP distribution. Each circle shows estimated 
marginal effects of changing level of PERIOD attribute on each bin of the histogram. The estimates are 
based on the OLS regression with clustered standard error; horizontal bars represent the 90% and 95% 
confidence interval.   
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Fig 8. Estimated effect of ORGANIZATION attribute on the WTP distribution. Each circle shows estimated 
marginal effects of changing level of ORGANIZATION attribute on each bin of the histogram. The 
estimates are based on the OLS regression with clustered standard error; horizontal bars represent the 
90% and 95% confidence interval. 
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B Details of respondents’ characteristics 
B.1 Primary and secondary jobs 
 [Table 1 around here] 
In all, 43.4% of household heads are engaged in farming, and typically tomato 
production (see Table 1). In Inlay area, farmers cultivate tomatoes for six months 
starting from March or April, and take on other jobs for the rest of the year, such as 
fishing, carpentry, and seasonal jobs. Although tomatoes can be harvested after 40 days 
from shedding seeds, farmers divide their floating gardens into blocks, and seeding and 
harvesting are scheduled to be repeated every 6 weeks to 14 weeks. Thus, farmers are 
usually engaged in tomato farming for six months. It is specially noted that in 2015, 
tomato production in the delta region in the south of the country, which is a competitor 
of Inlay tomatoes, was severely damaged by flooding. As a result, tomatoes from Inlay 
enjoyed higher prices, approximately double the usual price, which inflates our income 
statistics. On the other hand, fishing is more common as a secondary job (77 household 
heads) than as a primary job (44 household heads). Fishing used to be a high-income 
source in the past, but fishery resources have decreased, particularly the Inlay carp 
(Cyprinus Carpio Intha), known locally as nga-phein, which have diminished owing to 
sedimentation and eutrophication (Su and Jassby 2000). 
 
Table A1. Primary and secondary jobs 
Number of
household
heads
Composition
(%)
Number of
household
heads
Composition
(%)
Farmer 142 43.4% Fisher 77 23.5%
Fisher 44 13.5% Wage worker for farming 22 6.7%
Wage worker for farming 27 8.3% Shopkeeper 18 5.5%
Carpenter 26 8.0% Farmer 7 2.1%
Local cheroot 10 3.1% Boat driver 5 1.5%
Small business 8 2.4% Wage work for tailoring 5 1.5%
Shopkeeper 7 2.1% Small business 3 0.9%
Trader/Broker 6 1.8%
Various others 26 8.0% Various others 44 13.5%
No primary jobs 31 9.5% No secondary jobs 146 44.6%
Total 327 100.0% 327 100.0%
Primary Secondary 
 
  
Table A2. Distribution of total household income by source.
Source Composition (%)
Farming 36.13
Fishing 15.30
Small business 10.01
Carpenter 6.09
Wage work for farming 6.39
Local cheroot 5.22
Trader/Broker 4.08
Wage work for tailoring 4.05
Boat driver 2.00
Various others 10.73
Total 100.00
